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Abstract
Background: During December 2014–February 2015, an Ebola outbreak in a village in Kono district, Sierra Leone,
began following unsafe funeral practices after the death of a person later confirmed to be infected with Ebola virus.
In response, disease surveillance officers and community health workers, in collaboration with local leadership and
international partners, conducted 1 day of active surveillance and health education for all households in the village
followed by ongoing outreach. This study investigated the impact of these interventions on the outbreak.
Methods: Fifty confirmed Ebola cases were identified in the village between December 1, 2014 and February
28, 2015. Data from case investigations, treatment facility and laboratory records were analyzed to characterize
the outbreak. The reproduction number (R) was estimated by fitting to the observed distribution of secondary
cases. The impact of the active surveillance and health education was evaluated by comparing two outcomes
before and after the day of the interventions: 1) the number of days from symptom onset to case-patient
isolation or death and 2) a reported epidemiologic link to a prior Ebola case.
Results: The case fatality ratio among the 50 confirmed Ebola cases was 64.0 %. Twenty-three cases occurred
among females (46.0 %); the mean age was 39 years (median: 37 years; range: 5 months to 75 years). Forty-three (87.8 %)
cases were linked to the index case; 30 (61.2 %) were either at the funeral of Patient 1 or had contact with him while
he was ill. R was 0.93 (95 % CI: 0.15–2.3); excluding the funeral, R was 0.29 (95 % CI: 0.11–0.53). The mean
number of days in the community after onset of Ebola symptoms decreased from 4.0 days (median: 3 days;
95 % CI: 3.2–4.7) before the interventions to 2.9 days (median: 2 days; 95 % CI: 1.6–4.3) afterward. An
epidemiologic link was reported in 47.6 % of case investigations prior to and 100 % after the interventions.
Conclusions: Initial case investigation and contact tracing were hindered by delayed reporting and
under-reporting of symptomatic individuals from the community. Active surveillance and health education
contributed to quicker identification of suspected cases, interrupting further transmission.
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Background
The largest known Ebola virus disease (Ebola) outbreak
occurred in West Africa in 2014–15 [1]. In Sierra Leone,
one of the three heavily affected countries, Ebola was
first recognized in May 2014 [1] and eventually spread
to all 14 districts in the country. Health officials in Kono
district, located on the eastern border with Guinea, iden-
tified approximately 230 confirmed Ebola cases between
December 2014 and April 2015, after which there was
no evidence for ongoing transmission in Kono. Fifty of
these case-patients lived or worked in one village.
Ebola virus is a filovirus (Filoviridae family) with three
species known to cause large outbreaks of disease in
humans; the outbreak in West Africa involved the Zaire
species. Symptoms of Ebola infection include fever,
headache, fatigue, muscle pain, vomiting, diarrhea,
abdominal pain, and unexplained hemorrhage. The incu-
bation period ranges 2–21 days (mean 4–10). Death or
recovery usually occurs 6–16 days or 6–11 days after
symptom onset, respectively. The case fatality rate of the
Zaire Ebola species has been reported as 60–90 % in
prior outbreaks [2, 3].
The introduction of Ebola virus into human popula-
tions likely occurs via contact with an infected animal,
such as a fruit bat [2, 3]. However, during an outbreak,
person-to-person transmission occurs through direct
contact with the body or body fluids of an infected case,
including blood, vomit, saliva, urine, feces, and semen,
through broken skin or unprotected mucous membranes
[2–4]. Caring for infected persons and funeral practices
in which attendees have direct contact with the deceased
can be particularly dangerous [3, 5].
Key strategies to control an Ebola outbreak include
setting up a surveillance system to interrupt transmis-
sion and social mobilization and health education pro-
grams to promote protective behaviors and discourage
high-risk behaviors in communities [3]. Active surveil-
lance helps identify symptomatic patients rapidly so they
can be isolated, in order to reduce the likelihood of
transmission to others, and treated. Case investigations,
as part of surveillance activities, identify potential
sources of infection and contacts of suspected cases.
In turn, this information can inform health educa-
tion messages and interventions around high-risk be-
haviors in the community and facilitate monitoring
of contacts for 21 days, i.e. contact tracing, allowing
for their rapid isolation and treatment should symp-
toms develop.
Cluster description
On December 14, 2014, disease surveillance officers investi-
gated the death of a 75 year-old taxi driver and community
leader (Patient 1, the index case, Fig. 1) from a village in
Kono District (population approximately 1,000 residents)
not previously known to be an area of ongoing transmis-
sion. Two days prior, Patient 1 had reported to the district
hospital with unknown symptoms. He was clinically diag-
nosed with a stroke, his second, and sent home. Within
48 h of discharge, he developed diarrhea and vomiting and
died at home. The day following his death, the district
burial team was informed, obtained an oral swab sample
for laboratory testing (which was later confirmed to be
positive), and buried the body. The team noted that the
body had been washed and prepared for burial according to
traditional funeral practices that were banned after the
Ebola epidemic began; however, the family denied holding a
funeral or touching the body. No epidemiologic link to an
Ebola case, alive or deceased, was discovered. District
surveillance officers identified 14 contacts of the decedent
from four households for quarantine and monitoring.
On December 23, district surveillance officers investi-
gated six suspected Ebola cases in the village where
Patient 1 died. Five more suspected Ebola cases were
identified during the next 2 days, followed by an
additional 15 suspected Ebola cases on December 26.
Initial investigations of these suspected cases did not
clearly identify an epidemiologic link to Patient 1 or to
any other suspected or confirmed case. Furthermore,
delayed reporting of additional symptomatic individuals
and contacts of suspected Ebola cases hindered public
health officials’ ability to respond swiftly.
On December 27, district leaders, disease surveillance
officers, and local and international partners conducted
two public health interventions in the village: active
surveillance to identify symptomatic individuals for isola-
tion and treatment and health education for all residents.
Initial interviews were conducted with suspected case-
patients or their proxies, e.g. spouses and adult children,
to gather information about Ebola exposures. In the
weeks that followed, surveillance officers made daily
visits and conducted numerous follow-up interviews.
We conducted a field investigation to determine the
likely sources of Ebola infection for the index case and
other cases in the village, and potential opportunities for
prevention of future Ebola infections.
Objectives
This paper aims to describe the field investigation,
providing insight into the role of high risk behavior-
s—e.g., unsafe funeral practices and care of infected
persons—in driving the outbreak in this village, and
evaluate the impact of active surveillance and health
education on preventing further Ebola transmission.
Methods
Ebola cases were defined according to national protocols
at the time [6]. A suspected Ebola case required fever
and at least three other symptoms OR fever or bleeding
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in someone with an epidemiological link to an Ebola
case OR a sudden, unexplained death; a probable case
required fever and at least three other symptoms and an
epidemiological link OR a sudden, unexplained death
and an epidemiological link. Cases were confirmed using
reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR) testing on blood specimens collected from patients
or oral swabs collected from deceased individuals [6].
Suspected cases reported by health facilities or the
general public were investigated using a nationally stan-
dardized case investigation form. Surveillance officers
collected information on clinical presentation, prior
medical care received for this illness, and any epidemio-
logic link to suspected or confirmed Ebola cases. Epide-
miologic links included contact with a sick person (alive
or dead), funeral attendance and/or contact with the
body, travel away from home, and visiting a healthcare
facility prior to symptom onset. Contact with a sick
person or body was defined as touching body fluids of a
case (blood, vomit, saliva, urine, feces), direct physical
contact with the body (alive or dead), touching or shar-
ing clothes, linens, or eating utensils, or sleeping, eating,
or spending time in the same room or household as a
case. When possible, officers interviewed the patient dir-
ectly; in the case of a death investigation or when the
patient was too ill to be interviewed, family members or
other proxies were interviewed. Officers also identified
and collected detailed data on contacts of suspected
cases for monitoring and possible quarantine.
The public health interventions, active surveillance
and health education, were conducted on December 27
by disease surveillance officers, community health
workers, ambulance personnel, district leaders, and local
and international partners. Active surveillance consisted
of visiting every home in the village (approximately 200
homes) to identify symptomatic individuals. All residents
of each home were asked to come outside and inter-
viewed to determine if they were currently experiencing
symptoms consistent with Ebola. Trained health education
teams then began to educate residents on symptoms of
Ebola, how to notify authorities about sick individuals
through the national hotline, and the importance of early
treatment for those who are infected. During this inter-
action, community health workers and surveillance officers
observed the residents for signs of illness. Symptomatic in-
dividuals were isolated, interviewed using standard case in-
vestigation forms, and transported by ambulance to the
Ebola holding center at the district hospital and, later, an
Ebola treatment unit in another district.
Case investigation data were entered into the district
Ebola database (Epi Info 7, CDC, Atlanta, GA). Informa-
tion subsequently collected from laboratory testing and
Fig. 1 Ebola transmission and time in community after symptom onset for 50 patients with confirmed Ebola
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patient outcome data were added to the same database.
Case investigators gathered additional information dur-
ing follow-up visits and interviews.
Qualitative data from interviews with disease surveil-
lance officers and data from case investigations, treat-
ment facility records, and laboratory results for all
suspected, probable, and confirmed cases of Ebola iden-
tified in the village between December 1, 2014 and
February 28, 2015 were analyzed to characterize the epi-
demiology of the outbreak. Insufficient data were avail-
able on cases identified in October and November 2014
(four suspected and one probable) and were excluded;
none were known to be associated with the outbreak
described here from the limited information available.
As of October 24, 2016, no cases have been identified in
the village since February 2015.
The reproduction number (R) was estimated with and
without Patient 1’s funeral. Estimates based on Poisson
and negative binomial distributions for secondary cases
were compared using the Akaike information criteria
(AIC) to determine the best model fit [7]. Confidence
intervals were generated using non-parametric boot-
straps (1000 resampled data sets).
The impact of public health interventions was evalu-
ated using two outcome variables: 1) the amount of time
after symptom onset that a suspected case-patient
remained in the community before isolation or death
and 2) whether the case-patient had a known epidemio-
logic link. For both outcomes, we compared cases with
symptom onset before and after the interventions on
December 27. Time in the community was calculated as
the number of days from reported onset of symptoms to
either death in the community or admission to a health-
care facility. Patient 41 was in a healthcare facility at the
time of reported symptom onset; her time in the com-
munity was calculated from date of discharge to her
death in the community. Reporting of epidemiologic
links was expected to improve with health education.
Few epidemiologic links were reported during the initial
case investigations, despite obvious signs of body wash-
ing and preparation; we hypothesized health education
would improve willingness to report any links. Unknown
links to Ebola cases from other districts also were con-
sidered fairly unlikely due to limited mobility of the
village residents. All confirmed Ebola cases in the village
(the entire study population) were included in the
analyses; however, given the objective to compare the
pre- and post-intervention outcomes, t-test and chi-
squared statistical tests were conducted to assist in inter-
preting the results.
Results
Between December 1, 2014 and February 28, 2015, a
total of 50 laboratory confirmed Ebola cases (including
the index case) were identified. The case fatality ratio
among the 50 confirmed Ebola cases was 64.0 % (n = 32),
of whom 15.6 % (n = 5) died in the community or on the
day they were admitted to a healthcare facility. Twenty-
three cases occurred among females (46.0 %). The mean
age of the 50 Ebola case-patients was 39 years (median:
37 years; range: 5 months to 75 years), six were aged
0–14 years, 27 were aged 15–49 years, and 17 were
50 years and older. Four (8 %) cases provided healthcare
either to confirmed cases in their homes, such as with
family or neighbors, or in a healthcare facility.
The investigation linked 43 (87.8 %) of the 49 con-
firmed Ebola cases (other than Patient 1) to Patient 1, 27
(62.8 %) of whom died (Fig. 1). Of the 49 Ebola cases
(other than Patient 1), 30 (61.2 %) Ebola cases were first
generation, directly linked to either the funeral of Patient
1 or contact with him while he was ill. Following further
investigation, disease surveillance officers determined
that 24 (49.0 %) of the 49 Ebola case-patients likely were
infected at the index patient’s funeral. Thirteen
additional confirmed Ebola cases resulted from exposure
to secondary cases, including a teacher who cared for
several secondary cases (Patient 36).
Six confirmed Ebola cases were not linked to Patient
1, the index case. In two cases, (Patients 32 and 33)
patients had symptom onset dates consistent with
exposure to Patient 1, but could not be directly linked to
Patient 1 through initial case investigations or follow-up
interviews after the outbreak. One of these cases
occurred in a nurse at the district hospital who had
cared for at least one confirmed Ebola case-patient from
another village. Another confirmed Ebola case-patient
(Patient 41) was identified as having symptoms consist-
ent with Ebola during the active surveillance, but tested
negative for Ebola twice and was sent home on January
1, 2015. This patient died in the community on January
10 and was confirmed as infected with Ebola post-
mortem. The patient may have become infected on
December 27 while being transported in an ambulance
on rough, unpaved roads for 4 h to an Ebola treatment
unit with other patients later confirmed to have
Ebola. She is suspected to be the source case for her
child (Patient 47). The final, unlinked confirmed
Ebola case (Patient 50) likely was infected through ex-
posure to a family member from another village who
had a confirmed Ebola case.
Among the 50 confirmed Ebola cases, funeral attendance
and unsafe funeral practices were the likely sources of in-
fection for 27 (54.0 %) cases whereas caring for or contact
with sick patients was the likely source for 19 (38.0 %)
others (Fig. 2). None of the confirmed Ebola case-patients
reported travel to affected areas outside the village.
Among the 46 cases with explicit links, the mean
reproduction number (R) was 0.93 (95 % CI: 0.15–2.3)
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with a variance of 9.83 (95 % CI: 0.16–77) using a
negative binomial distribution. Excluding Patient 1’s
funeral event, R was 0.29 (95 % CI: 0.11–0.55), with vari-
ance 0.49 (95 % CI: 0.11–1.48). In each instance, Poisson
means were similar but the fits from the negative
binomial distribution were a vast improvement when the
funeral case was included (AIC 45 vs 125 for Poisson)
and slightly better without the funeral case (32.4 vs 34).
Not all of the 50 confirmed Ebola cases met the
suspected or probable Ebola case definition. Of 32 con-
firmed Ebola cases with sufficient information on symp-
toms and potential epidemiologic links, nine (69.2 %)
surviving Ebola cases and 14 (73.7 %) deceased Ebola
cases met the probable or suspected Ebola case defin-
ition at the time of the initial investigation (Table 1). Of
the nine who did not meet case definition, seven
(87.5 %, one missing) reported not having an elevated
temperature, four (44.4 %) reported fewer than three
symptoms, and five (55.6 %) reported no epidemiologic
link to a suspected or confirmed Ebola case.
Before the public health interventions, the mean num-
ber of days in the community after onset of Ebola symp-
toms was 4.0 days (median: 3 days; 95 % CI: 3.2–4.7).
After the public health interventions, the mean days in
the community decreased to 2.9 days (median: 2 days;
95 % CI: 1.6–4.3); this was not statistically different from
the pre-intervention mean (t = −1.5, p = 0.15). However,
when excluding Patient 41 who was sent home after
testing negative for Ebola and later died of Ebola at
home, the time in the community was significantly
lower at 2.5 days (median: 2 days; 95 % CI: 1.4–3.7;
t = −2.2, p = 0.04) after the interventions. The earlier
detection of confirmed Ebola cases did not lead to
improved survival, however; the case fatality ratio
increased from 58.8 to 73.3 % (X2 = 1.2, p = 0.27).
Follow-up interviews conducted by surveillance offi-
cers led to improved understanding of the outbreak and
data collection as survivors and family members often
provided information that had been withheld during
earlier interviews. For example, it was not until surveil-
lance officers conducted follow-up interviews with a
work colleague and confirmed Ebola case that they
learned how Patient 1 likely was infected. In early
December 2014, Patient 1 drove a sick family member
from a neighboring village to the district hospital; vom-
itus from the sick passenger got on both Patient 1 and
his taxi. Although Patient 1 did not inform his family, he
insisted they keep their distance from him. After his
death on December 14, friends and relatives held a
secret funeral at night, washing and preparing his body
for burial, before calling for the district safe-burial team.
Though the details of this funeral are unknown, touching
and/or kissing the body of the deceased is common and,
like washing the body, increases the likelihood of direct
contact with the deceased’s body fluids and the virus.
Survivors and family members also provided more in-
formation during initial investigations after the public
health interventions. During the initial case investigation
Fig. 2 Number of confirmed Ebola cases (N = 50) by date of symptom onset and exposure type
Table 1 Status of patients (N = 32) with confirmed Ebola based
on initial case investigation dataa
Case definition at initial
presentation
Survivors Deceased Total
No. (%) No. (%) No. (%)
Insufficient information to
record as suspect or
probable Ebola case
4 (30.8 %) 5 (26.3 %) 9 (28.1 %)
Suspected Ebola case 6 (46.2 %) 5 (26.3 %) 11 (34.4 %)
Probable Ebola case 3 (23.1 %) 9 (47.4 %) 12 (37.5 %)
Total 13 (100 %) 19 (100 %) 32 (100 %)
aAmong patients with complete record of symptoms and epidemiological history
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of Patient 1, only seven (23.3 %) of the 30 confirmed
Ebola cases likely infected by Patient 1 were identified as
contacts. Before the interventions, 47.6 % of initial case
investigations (10 of 21 with data available) identified an
epidemiologic link to a prior Ebola case (as reported by
the patients or their proxies). After the interventions,
100 % (8 of 8 with data available) of case investigations
identified epidemiologic links. This difference was statis-
tically significant (X2 = 7.4, p < 0.01).
Discussion
The 2014–2015 Ebola epidemic in West Africa was the
largest ever. In a village in eastern Kono District, Sierra
Leone, the delayed confirmation of Ebola in a patient
followed by high-risk behaviors (unsafe funeral practices
and caring for ill individuals without adequate personal
protective equipment) led to an Ebola outbreak with 43
additional confirmed Ebola cases and 27 deaths.
The active surveillance and health education imple-
mented by health authorities and partners in the village
appeared to contribute to the reduced time from onset
of disease to reporting of suspected cases and health
facility admission and improved ability of disease surveil-
lance officers to link suspected and confirmed Ebola
cases during initial case investigations. Based on our
experience in the field, we believe that these changes
were at least partially due to improved trust in health
authorities; however, the impact of the interventions
cannot be distinguished from improved cooperation of
patients and their proxies due to the trauma of witnes-
sing their family, friends, or neighbors becoming ill with
Ebola. Overall, the decrease in mean time in the com-
munity after Ebola symptoms developed likely positively
contributed to a more rapid reduction in the spread of
Ebola in the community (Fig. 2). The survival of con-
firmed Ebola cases decreased after the public health in-
terventions. This may be due to chance, considering the
small number of cases, but also may reflect the limited
medical care available in treatment facilities that were
receiving patients from multiple, concurrent outbreaks.
The R in this Ebola outbreak was 0.93 overall, consist-
ent with investigations of other outbreaks. A study of 15
Ebola outbreaks in Liberia found R = 1.7; R was reduced
to 0.1 after the implementation of immediate isolation
or transfer of symptomatic persons to Ebola treatment
units, contact identification and monitoring [8]. In this
outbreak, all but five confirmed cases were transferred
to the Ebola holding center or treatment unit, the time
to transfer decreased, and contact identification im-
proved over time. When Patient 1’s funeral event was re-
moved from the analysis, the R decreased from 0.93 to
0.29, likely reflecting the effect of active surveillance and
quicker reporting of ill residents to health authorities
following the Ebola transmission from the funeral. In
general, the reproduction number varies across cultural,
geographic settings, and at different time points in an
outbreak [9]; therefore some variation from findings in
Liberia is expected.
The accurate identification of suspected Ebola cases is
crucial for early detection, improved patient outcomes,
and limiting community transmission [9, 10]. However
new diseases present diagnostic challenges, particularly
early in outbreaks when clinician familiarity may be lim-
ited; additionally, unusual clinical presentation or co-
morbid conditions may make diagnosis more difficult.
Timely distribution of information to health facilities
could help clinicians to accurately diagnose new dis-
eases, particularly during outbreaks of high-consequence
pathogens such as Ebola. Also helpful is provision to pa-
tients and contacts of clear materials upon discharge
from health facilities that describe signs and symptoms
of the disease and steps to take should symptoms of dis-
ease develop. Wider distribution of health education
materials and messages throughout communities could
improve identification of additional cases.
We documented several instances in which critical in-
formation was withheld by patients or their proxies dur-
ing initial investigation, such as the fact that a funeral
had been conducted for Patient 1, likely exacerbating
transmission in this outbreak. This denial likely was due
to the national legislation banning such practices and
may have affected contact tracing and the early identifi-
cation and isolation of suspected cases, cornerstones of
Ebola prevention and control activities [11]. Simple mes-
sages and materials educating the general public on the
importance of avoiding high-risk behaviors, even when
Ebola is not suspected, may promote cooperation with
health authorities during case investigations and other
public health activities.
Nine patients who were ultimately confirmed as Ebola
cases (and who had a complete medical record) apparently
did not meet the Ebola suspected or probable case defin-
ition upon initial presentation due to failure to identify or
report key Ebola symptoms or a history of contact with an
Ebola patient. These cases highlight the known challenge
to early case identification using current case definitions
[12] particularly when case investigators do not have clin-
ical training and patients are not evaluated by a clinician
at the time of the case investigation. These individuals
may increase the risk of infection among their caregivers
and healthcare workers if they are not recognized as sus-
pected cases. Health promotion messages discouraging
the public from caring for sick family members, whenever
possible, during an outbreak and early infection control
interventions at health facilities are warranted. Alternative
case definitions for Ebola, with consideration for severely
ill patients from areas with high transmission, should be
investigated for use in future outbreaks.
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Conclusions
A single missed diagnosis and unsafe funeral resulted in
a large Ebola outbreak in a village in Kono with 43 con-
firmed cases and 27 deaths over 8 weeks. Active surveil-
lance and community health education were associated
with a decrease in days from Ebola onset to health facil-
ity admission and may be considered for other similar
outbreaks. Timely, clear materials and messages to
educate the public on signs and symptoms of disease,
steps to report potential cases, and the importance of
avoiding and reporting high-risk behaviors are essential
for early case identification, isolation, and reduced trans-
mission in the community.
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